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Abstract 
 
In light of the apparent failure to agree to directly address climate change through emissions 
reductions, attention is increasingly focusing on alternative options to reduce the impacts of 
climate change.  Some of these options involve engineering the earth to reduce the impact or 
affect of climate change; in particular, marine geo-engineering is seeking to explore ocean-
based climate change mitigation measures.  One of these options – the sub-seabed 
sequestration of carbon dioxide – has recently (and controversially) been addressed by the 
1996 London Protocol to the 1972 London (Dumping) Convention.  The parties to the 1996 
Protocol have also asserted that this instrument has jurisdiction over ocean fertilization 
activities and are currently developing guidelines designed to permit fertilization for the 
purpose of science only.  Neither sequestration nor fertilization fits entirely comfortably 
within the dumping regime, and it is clear that other geo-engineering schemes (such as those 
involving the deposit of devices into the ocean and the placement of dams across straits) will 
fall outside of the regulatory remit of these instruments.  
This paper will explore the extent to which the law of the sea is capable of 
responding to the marine geo-engineering challenge, and whether the current regulatory 
tools provide the appropriate regulatory framework for proactive management of marine 
geo-engineering.  This paper will conclude with an outline of a proposal for the development 
of a regime to regulate emerging climate change mitigation technologies.  Whilst policy 
questions and general principles relating to geo-engineering are arguably best addressed 
within the regime established by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, detailed regulation and management of geo-engineering technologies is 
better suited to institutions and regimes that have specialist expertise in the area of the 
technology in question.  The proposal developed in the final part of this paper  attempts to 
address both these requirements.   
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Introduction 
 
Over the last couple of days we have been exploring the theme of this conference within a 
variety of contexts.  The essential question put to us by the Conference organizers is whether 
international law is in crisis and able only to react to events, or, more positively, whether it is 
able to proactively influence and guide action and decision-making. In this paper I intend to 
explore this question within a very particular context; marine geo-engineering.  The term 
geo-engineering was coined by Cesare Marchetti in 1977 in connection with what he referred 
to as the CO2 problem,
1 but more broadly, geo-engineering can be defined to mean “the 
intentional large scale manipulation of the environment.”2  The history of geo-engineering 
dates back to at least the 1840s when James Pollard Espy, the first US government 
meteorologist (and former lawyer) proposed burning vast areas of forest in order to create 
columns of heated air which, in his opinion would tripper precipitation.3  Seeding clouds for 
the purpose of generating rainfall has been carried out since the late 1940s – and continues 
to be used today – and cloud seeding has also been used to lessen the intensity of hurricanes, 
to improve air quality and, less benignly, by the United States as so-called “weather warfare” 
in Vietnam.4 In fact, concern that a very real “weather-warfare race” was developing between 
the US and the (then) USSR led directly to the negotiation and adoption of the UN 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental 
Modification Techniques (ENMOD) in 1976.5  More recently, the term geo-engineering has 
become closely associated with climate change mitigation and its raison d’être – climate 
change mitigation – is now ubiquitously central to its modern definition.   For example, the 
2009 Royal Society Report (UK) on Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty 
defines geo-engineering as “the deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary 
environment to counteract anthropogenic climate change.”6 The House of Commons’ 2010 
Report in the UK on The Regulation of Geoengineering similarly refers to “activities specifically 
and deliberately designed to effect a change in the global climate with the aim of minimizing 
or reversing anthropogenic climate change” in its definition of geo-engineering.7   
Geo-engineering was first formally proposed as a means of addressing climate 
change in 1965 in a policy assessment provided to the US President Lyndon Johnson.  In 
fact, geo-engineering was the only option given to President Johnson in this report; the 
reduction of emissions was not a suggested solution to a warming climate.8   Until very 
recently geo-engineering was regarded as something as a fringe topic.  It benefits from only a 
                                                 
1 C. Marchetti, “On Geo-engineering and the CO2 Problem” 1 (1977) Climate Change 59. 
2 J. Virgo, “International governance of a possible geo-engineering intervention to combat climate change” 95 
(2009) Climate Change 103. 
3 James R. Flemming, “The Climate Engineers” 31 (2007) The Wilson Quarterly 46 – 60 at 51. 
4 Ibid, at 55 – 56.  For an engaging introduction to the history of geoengineering see David W. Keith, 
“Geoengineering the Climate: History and Prospect” 25 (2000) Annu. Rev. Energy Environ. 245 – 284. For a 
more in-depth study see Jeff Goodell, How to Cool the Planet: Geoengineering and the Audacious Quest to Fix Earth’s 
Climate (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: Boston) (2010).  For a technical analysis of a number of different 
technologies see G. Bala, “Problems with geoengineering schemes to combat climate change” 96  (10 January 
2009) Current Science 41 – 58; T. M. Lenton and N. E. Vaughn, “The radiative forcing potential of different 
climate geoengineering options” 9 (2009) Atmos. Chem. Phys. 5539 – 5561;  
5 16 ILM 88 (1977) (in force 1978). 
6 Royal Society, Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (2009) at 15. 
7 House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, The Regulation of Geo-engineering (5th Report of 
Session 2009 – 10) at 3. 
8 David W. Keith, op cit. n. 4 at 254. 
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couple of paragraphs in the entire IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report released in 20079 and is 
not mentioned at all in the Stern Review Report on the Economics of Climate Change released by the 
British government in 2006.10  David Victor has recently commented that the entire 
“scientific literature on the subject could be read during the course of a transatlantic flight”.11  
(It is not apparent as to whether this is simply speculation on Victor’s part or whether he 
proved his hypothesis over a particular journey!)  The view that geo-enginneering is a fringe 
topic is however, undoubtedly changing.  Two high profile reports released in 2003 in the 
United States by the Pentagon12 and the National Research Council13 both recommended 
that further research into geo-engineering as a climate change mitigation measure should be 
carried out.  In the UK, the Royal Society published a report entitled Geo-engineering the 
Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty in September 200914 and two Parliamentary 
Committees have recently published reports on issues associated with geo-engineering.15  At 
the international level, geo-engineering or, more particularly, one form of geo-engineering – 
ocean fertilization – is currently under serious consideration by the parties to at least two 
international instruments; the 1996 Protocol to the 1972 London (Dumping) Convention16 
and the 1992 Biodiversity Convention.17  The upward trend of interest in geo-engineering as 
a climate change mitigation measure is likely to increase; the economics of geo-engineering 
are, as described recently by Scott Barrett: “incredible”18 and thus potentially provide a cheap 
alternative to emissions reductions.  
This inevitably creates a challenge for international law.  To what extent can 
international law proactively manage these technologies as opposed to merely react and 
respond to ad hoc developments?  
 
 
                                                 
9 B. Metz et al, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) (2007) at para 11.2.2. 
10 The full report is available online at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.  
11 David G. Victor et al, “The Geoengineering Option: A Last Resort Against Global Warming?” 88 (2009) 
Foreign Affairs 64 – 76 at 73. 
12 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National 
Security (October 2003) Available online at: http://www.edf.org/documents/3566_AbruptClimateChange.pdf 
13National Research Council, Critical Issues in Weather Modification Research (Washington: The National Academies 
Press) (2003) available online at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10829#toc.  
14 The Royal Society, Geo-engineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty (Policy Document 10/09) 
(2009) available online at: http://royalsociety.org/Geoengineering-the-climate/.  For commentary on the 
Report see Geoff Brumfiel, “Climate Control Plans Scrutinized” 461 (September 2009) Nature 19; John A. 
Glaser, “Climate geo-engineering” 12 (2010) Clean Techn Environ Policy 91 – 95.   
15 House of Commons, Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee, Engineering: turning ideas into 
reality: Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report (Fifth Special Report of Session 2008 – 2009) (June 
2009)  available on line at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmdius/759/759.pdf; House of Commons 
Science and Technology Committee, The Regulation of Geoengineering (Fifth Report of Session 2009 – 2010) 
(March 2010) available online at: 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/221.pdf.  
16 36 ILM 7 (1997) (in force 2006).  
17 31 ILM 818 (1992) (in force 1993).  Notably ocean fertilization has also received attention from the United 
Nations General Assembly in UNGA Resolution 62/215 Oceans and the Law of the Sea  (2007) (para. 98) and 
UNGA Resolution 64/17 Oceans and the Law of the Sea (2009) (paras. 132 and 133).  See also the 2009 Report of 
the Secretary General on the Law of the Sea (A/65/69, 2009) at para 86. 
18 Scott Barrett, “The Incredible Economics of Geo-engineering” 39 (2008) Environ Resource Econ 45 – 54 at 49. 
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Marine Geo-engineering: Options of Last Resort? 
 
Geo-engineering for climate change mitigation purposes generally falls into one of two 
categories.  First, those focused on solar radiation management or albedo enhancement such 
as injecting sulfur or other reflective particles into the atmosphere19 or placing sunshades or 
strategically positioned mirrors in outer space.20 Second, technologies designed to remove 
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.  
For the purposes of this paper, I will confine my discussion to technologies that 
exploit the marine environment for climate change mitigation purposes.  The majority of 
technologies currently under consideration seek to use the oceans to change the balance of 
carbon dioxide between the atmosphere and the oceans (in practice to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere) rather than attempt to increase the reflectivity of the ocean through greater ice-
cover or through placing reflective devices in the oceans.21   
The oceans, as is well known, contain about 38,000 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide 
which represents 55 times the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and 20 times the 
carbon dioxide contained in the biosphere and soils.22  Carbon dioxide is transferred from 
the surface of the ocean to deep waters by means of the biological and solubility pumps and 
ocean circulation.  Scientists and, increasingly, engineers have postulated that if either or 
both of these pumps could be enhanced, in order to draw down greater quantities of carbon 
dioxide, this would in effect operate as a climate change mitigation measure.  There are of 
course significant risks associated with increasing the level of carbon dioxide in the oceans 
including increased ocean acidity,23 diminished phytoplankton productivity and damage to 
ecosystems.24   
The marine geo-engineering method which has thus far received the greatest 
scientific and, consequently, regulatory attention, seeks to enhance the ocean’s biological 
pump by so-called fertilization techniques.25  This strategy exploits the fact that some ocean 
regions – most notably the Southern Ocean and the Equatorial Pacific – are relatively 
                                                 
19 Paul J. Crutzen, “Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a 
Policy Dilemma?” 77 (2006) Climatic Change 211 – 210; Robert E. Dickinson, “Climate Engineering: A Review 
of Aerosol Approaches to Changing the Global Energy Balance” 33 (1996) Climatic Research 279 – 290; Alan 
Robock et al, “Regional climate responses to geoengineering with tropical and Arctic SO2 injections” 113 
(2008) Journal of Geophysical Research D16101.  See also G. Bala et al, “Impact of geoengineering schemes on the 
global hydrological cycle” 105 (June 3 2008) PNAS 7664 – 7669; B. Govindasamy et al, “Impact of 
geoenginnering schemes on the terrestrial biosphere” 29 (2002)  Geophysical Research Letters No. 22, 20-61, 
doi:10.1029/2002GL015911.  
20 C. R. McInnes, “Spaced-based geoengineering: challenges and requirements” 224 (2010) Proc. IMechE Vol.224 
Part C: J. Mechanical Engineering Science 571 – 580.  
21 Nevertheless, the Royal Society in its 2009 Report on Geo-engineering the Climate: Science, Governance and 
Uncertainty noted that increasing the albedo or the reflectivity of the oceans could have a potentially significant 
beneficial effect on climate change.  However, serious proposals for enhancing ocean albedo have yet to be 
made (p. 26). 
22 CBD, Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean Fertilization on Marine Biodiversity (CBD Technical Series No. 45) 
(2009) at 11. 
23 H. Damon Matthews et al, “Sensitivity of ocean acidification to geoengineered climate stabilization” 36 
(2009) Geophysical Research Letters L10706 doi: 10.1029/2009/GL037488. 
24 Tom Garrison, Essentials of Oceanography (5th edition) (Brooks/ Cole Cengage Learning: Belmont) (2009) at 
379. 
25 See generally, A. Strong et al, “Ocean Fertilization: Science, Policy and Commerce” 22 (2009) Oceanography 
236; Theme Section – “Implications of Large-scale Iron Fertilization of the Oceans” 364 (2008) Marine 
Ecology Progress Series 213 – 309.   
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unproductive.  Within these regions biological production is limited by the low availability of 
one or more nutrients such as iron, nitrogen or phosphate.  If the missing nutrient is added 
to the ocean then in theory this will facilitate an increase in the biological productivity in the 
region and, as a consequence, enhance the draw-down of carbon dioxide.  As John Martin 
memorably put it in 1990: “Given me half a tanker of iron and I will give you an ice-age.26  
More than a dozen iron fertilization experiments have been carried out over the last decade 
mostly in the Southern Ocean.27  The results of this research are inconclusive: it is not clear 
how large the fertilized area needs to be in order to draw down a meaningful quantity of 
CO2
28
  and it is uncertain as to how long the sequestration of CO2 lasts for.
29 Moreover, this 
deliberate attempt to modify an ecosystem may well have negative impacts on the existing 
food chain of that ecosystem,30 could potentially induce the growth of toxic algae31 or the 
suffocation of that ecosystem or could even make climate change worse by leading to an 
increase in the release of methane and nitrous oxide.32   
Other marine geo-engineering techniques which have been suggested include: the 
use of vertical ocean pipes to pump deep water to the surface in order to increase the supply 
to nutrients at the surface with a view to enhancing the biological pump33; crop residue 
oceanic permanent sequestration – the disposal of baled crop residues in the deep ocean34; 
so-called weathering techniques which seek to increase the alkalinity of the oceans in order 
to reduce acidification and enhance the solubility pump35; modification and enhancement of 
sea-ice designed to enhance down-welling ocean currents36; and the building of strategic 
dams in order to isolate key bodies of water such as the Arctic Ocean or the 
Mediterranean.37   
 
 
                                                 
26 “J. Martin, “Glacial – Interglacial Change: The Iron Hypothesis” 5 (1990) Paleoceanography 1 at 10. 
27 CBD, Scientific Synthesis of the Impacts of Ocean Fertilization on Marine Biodiversity (CBD Technical Series No. 45) 
(2009) at 24. 
28 K. Buesseler et al, “The Effects of Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in the Southern Ocean” 304 
(2004) Science 417. 
29 S. Blain, “Effect of Natural Iron Fertilization on Carbon Sequestration in the Southern Ocean” 446 (2007) 
Nature 1070;  P. Boyd et al, “A Mesocale Phytoplankton Bloom in the Polar Southern Ocean Stimulated by Iron 
Fertilization” 407 (2000) Nature 695; K. Caldeira and P. Duffy, “The Role of the Southern Ocean in Uptake 
and Storage of Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide” 287 (2000) Science 620; 
30 A. Strong, “Ocean fertilization: time to move on” 461 (2009) Nature 347. 
31 Q. Schiermeier, “The Oresmen”421 (2003) Nature 109, 110. 
32 J. Furhman and D. Capone, “Possible Biogeochemical Consequences of Ocean Fertilization” 36 (1991) 
Limnology & Oceanography 1951; M. Lawrence, “Side-effects of Ocean Iron Fertilization” 297 (2002) Science 1993.  
33 See J. Lovelock and C. Rapley, “Ocean pipes could help the Earth to cure itself” Nature 449 (27 September 
2007) 403; A. Yool et al, “Low efficiency of nutrient translocation for enhancing oceanic uptake of carbon 
dioxide” 114  (2009) Journal of Geophysical Research 114   C08009, oi:10.1029/2008JC004792. 
34 S. Strand and G. Benford, “Ocean Sequestration of Crop Residue Carbon: Recycling Fossil Fuel Carbon 
Back to Deep Sediments” 43 (2009) Environ. Sci. Technol. 1001. 
35 L. Harvey, “Mitigating the atmospheric CO2 increase and ocean acidification by adding limestone powder to 
upwelling regions” 113 (2008) Journal of Geophysical Research 113;  K. House et al, “Electrochemical Acceleration 
of Chemical Weathering as an Energetically Feasible Approach to Mitigating Anthropogenic Climate Change” 
41 (2007) Environ. Sci. Technol. 8464; H. Kheshgi, “Sequestering Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide by Increasing 
Ocean Alkalinity” 20 (1995) 915. 
36 S. Zhou and P. C. Flynn, “Geoengineering Downwelling Ocean Currents: A Cost Assessment” 71 (2005) 
Climate Change 203. 
37 See for example R. Shutterhelm, Diomede Crossroads: Saving the North Pole?  Thoughts on Plausibility available 
online at:  http://www.cleverclimate.org/art/uploads/Diomede_Crossroads(1).pdf. 
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Governance Challenges 
 
Before turning to the current legal framework it is helpful to identify some of the 
governance challenges which are associated with marine geo-engineering.  There are 
undoubtedly many such challenges but I am going to content myself with six for the 
purposes of this paper.   
First, all of these proposals are, in the words of the 2007 IPCC Report, largely 
speculative and unproven.38  In contrast to techniques which focus on enhancing the Earth’s 
albedo, marine geo-engineering technologies will potentially need a significant period of time 
to have an impact on global climate if, that is, they are capable of having such an impact.  
Moreover, the risks associated with these technologies are also unknown and could be 
significant.  In short, the cure could be worse than the disease.   
There is also the question as to how the development of these technologies relate to 
more traditional mitigation strategies and, most importantly emissions reduction.  Although 
if they are to be used at all geo-engineering strategies should arguably form part of a wider 
portfolio of climate change mitigation strategies, there is a clear risk that they may in fact be 
viewed as an alternative to emissions reductions as, in effect, get-out-of-jail-free cards.  The 
reluctance of the international community to take meaningful measures to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions was publically demonstrated last December in Copenhagen and by 
the fact that global emissions are continuing to rise; at about 3 percent a year. The so-called 
moral-hazard argument is self-evident: if states or indeed individuals view these technologies 
as providing a quick fix they will feel no imperative to make the necessary life-style changes 
needed to address climate change in the longer term.   
The third challenge is that many of these techniques are relatively cheap and can 
potentially be undertaken unilaterally by individual states or even companies or wealthy 
individuals.39  Private corporations are already engaged in fertilization activities: the most well 
known are the US-based Climos40 and Planktos although the latter company stopped 
operating in 2008.  However, the Ocean Nourishment Corporation has recently conducted 
urea fertilization experiments in the Sulu Sea41 and Atmocean – also a US venture – is 
experimenting with the use of wave driven pumps to transfer nutrient rich deep water to the 
surface.42  Depending on the nature of the technology – and this issue is probably of greater 
concern to albedo enhancing technologies – states acting unilaterally and even individuals43 
have the potential capacity to unilaterally change our climate or otherwise re-engineer our 
environment. 
                                                 
38 B. Metz et al, Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge) (2007) at para 11.2.2. 
39 See further Scott Barrett, “The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering” 39 (2008) Environ Resource Econ 45 
- 54.  
40 Climos has plans to fertilize 40,000 square km of the Southern Ocean with iron for the sale of carbon offset 
credits.  See Aaron Strong et al, “Ocean fertilization: time to move on” 461 (17 September 2009) Nature 347 – 
348 at 348. 
41 J. Mayo-Ramsey, “Environmental, legal and social implications of ocean urea fertilization; Sulu Sea example” 
Marine Policy (2010) in press.  
42 R. Warner, “Preserving a Balanced Ocean: Regulating Climate Change Mitigation Activities in Marine Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction” 14 (2007) Australian International Law Journal 99 at 104. 
43 For example, Bill Gates has apparently contributed US$4.5 million to geoengineering research over the last 
three years.  See Clive Hamilton, The Return of Dr Strangelove: The Politics of Climate Engineering as a Response to 
Global Warming (June 2010) available online at: 
http://www.clivehamilton.net.au/cms/media/documents/articles/dr_strangeloves_return.pdf.  
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The fourth challenge focuses on the extent to which the risks presented by marine 
geo-engineering can be managed without stifling or inhibiting research altogether.  All of 
these techniques are currently at the early stages of research or indeed represent no more 
than mere proposals.  The safest way forward is obviously a moratorium on all marine geo-
engineering technologies but, given the seriousness of the climate change threat, we arguably 
cannot afford to simply ignore these potential options.  Concern over stifling research and 
innovation led the British House of Commons Science and Technology Committee in their 
2010 report on The Regulation of Geo-engineering to deliberately exclude the precautionary 
principle from their proposed list of governance principles.44   
The fifth challenge is managing the effects global and transboundary, intended and 
unintended of geo-engineering research and the actual deployment of such climate change 
mitigation technologies.  Should the rules relating to state responsibility and civil liability 
apply in the event that negative consequences ensue?  Some states are likely to benefit from 
climate change; how should their interests be represented in any governance regime?   
And finally, and arguably, most importantly who or what should decide which if any 
of the geo-engineering options should be developed?  Should technologies be developed on 
an ad hoc individual basis or do we need to take a more concerted or integrated approach?  
 
The Current International Legal Framework45  
 
Turning now to the international legal framework: there are very few examples of specific 
legal obligations which apply directly to marine geo-engineering activities – with the 
exception of Article 196(1) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS).  Nevertheless, UNCLOS provides for a range of rights and obligations which 
undoubtedly provide at least the bones of the framework for any governance regime.  For 
the purposes of today’s paper – in view of the time-constraints – I am not going to examine 
in detail this regime; I just intend to highlight in at least broad terms the types of obligations 
which are potentially applicable.   
 First, marine scientific research is undoubtedly a freedom of the high seas (Article 
87(1)(f) of the 1982 UNCLOS).  Moreover, a good case can be made for arguing that marine 
geo-engineering activities should likewise constitute a freedom of the high seas.46    
Nevertheless, high seas freedoms must be exercised with due regard for the interests of 
other states and in accordance with the provisions of UNCLOS.  This is particularly 
                                                 
44 House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, The Regulation of Geo-engineering (5th Report of 
Session 2009 – 10) (UK)) at para. 86. 
45 See generally, A. Carlin, “Global Climate Change Control: Is there a better Strategy than Reducing 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions?” 155 (2007) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1401; Daniel Bodansky, “May we 
engineer the climate?” 33 (1996) Climate Change 301 – 321;W. Davis, “What does Green Mean? Anthropogenic 
Climate Change, Geoengineering and International Law” 43 (2009) Georgia Law Review 901; J. Michaelson, 
“Geoengineering: A Climate Change Manhatten Project 17 (1988) Stanford Environmental Law Journal 73; 
Philomene Verlaan, “Geo-engineering, the Law of the Sea, and Climate Change” 4 (2009) Carbon and Climate 
Law Review 446 – 458; David G. Victor, “On the regulation of geo-engineering” 24 (2008) Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 322 – 336; D. Victor et al, “The Geoengineering Option: A Law Resort Against Global 
Warming” 88 (2009) Foreign Affairs 64; J. Virgo, “International governance of a possible geoengineering 
intervention to combat climate change” 95 (2009) Climate Change 103. 
46 This is based on the prevailing view that unless an activity is specifically excluded by a rule of international 
law then it should be regarded as a high seas freedom. See R. R. Churchill and A. V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea 
(3rd edition) (Manchester University Press: Manchester) (1999) at 206. 
ANZSIL 18th Annual Conference (24 – 26 June 2010) 
Karen.Scott@canterbury.ac.nz Page 8 
 
important where technologies involve placing objects into the sea such as pipes which might 
hinder navigation and where fertilization activities have a negative impact on fish stocks and 
other biological resources which may impact upon the freedom of fishing.  Similarly, 
although coastal states undoubtedly have exclusive jurisdiction in connection with both 
scientific research and, arguably, the exploitation of its waters for marine geo-engineering 
purposes (Article 56(1), UNCLOS) they too must exercise their rights with due regard to the 
rights of other states including the right of navigation (Article 56(2), UNCLOS).  In 
particular, where international straits are concerned foreign vessels are able to exercise the 
right of transit passage or, at the very least non-suspendable innocent passage and this would 
appear to preclude mega-infrastructure projects such as the damming of straits.47   
 Second, marine scientific research must be carried out in accordance with Part XIII 
of UNCLOS and in particular, with the principles set out in Article 240 of the Convention 
which include regard for other users and the requirement to comply with Part XII of 
UNCLOS on marine environmental protection.  Moreover, Article 245 provides for a 
number of principles related to the publication and dissemination of information connected 
to proposed major projects and the promotion of transfer of data, information and 
knowledge to developing states.  Moreover, marine scientific research and indeed all 
activities taking place within the Area – that is on the seabed beyond the jurisdiction of states 
– must be undertaken for the benefit of mankind (Article 140 UNCLOS).  Research 
activities taking place within the zones of coastal states are of course subject to the consent 
and control of that coastal state.48   
 In connection with scientific research involving ocean fertilization the parties to the 
1996 Protocol to the 1972 London Convention are in the process of developing an 
Assessment Framework which will be modeled on the risk and Management framework 
adopted in 2006 for the geological sequestration of carbon dioxide.  The Framework will 
require researchers to undertake an initial assessment, a detailed risk analysis (which includes 
an acknowledgement of data gaps) and research approvals should relate to defined areas and 
defined periods only.49   
 Third, scientific research and marine geo-engineering projects more generally must 
comply with the environmental safeguards set out in UNCLOS and developed under other 
global and regional instruments.  Article 192 of UNCLOS creates a general obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment and Article 194 requires states to take all 
measures to prevent the pollution of the marine environment from any source.  Pollution is 
defined in Article 1(4) of UNCLOS and it is of course open to interpretation as to whether 
all geo-engineering projects are likely to cause pollution in this sense.  Ocean fertilization 
projects and, more particularly, the utilization of deep ocean pumps appear – at least at first 
sight – one step removed from causing harm.   
 It is of course possible to identify with relative ease numerous additional 
environmental obligations can be identified from within Part XII of UNCLOS itself, under 
other marine-focused and environmental agreements and as principles of international law.  I 
can do no more than highlight them here this afternoon.  They might include (but are 
certainly not restricted to) environmental impact assessment; prior notification, consultation 
and cooperation more generally; the minimization of transboundary harm and the obligation 
                                                 
47 Part III of the 1982 UNCLOS. 
48 Articles 245 and 246 of the 1982 UNCLOS. 
49 See the Annex attached to the Report of the Ocean Fertilization Working Group (LC/SG 32 WP.7 (28 May 
2009). 
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to refrain from transferring one type of pollution into another; the requirement to develop 
contingency plans and to monitor activities and to adapt management where that is 
appropriate; considering the ecosystem as a whole, taking a precautionary approach where 
information is uncertain and the activity risks substantial harm to the environment as well as 
principles relating to state responsibility and civil liability.   
 Nevertheless, identifying the likely principles and concepts which undoubtedly 
underpin the regulation of marine geo-engineering is not the same as governance.  There is 
currently no international organization with a clear regulatory mandate over marine geo-
engineering.  Following its Statement of Concern issued in 200750 in connection with ocean 
fertilization activities the parties to the London Protocol declared in 2008 that the remit of 
both the Protocol and the Convention includes fertilization activities and, that in order to 
provide for legitimate scientific research, such research should be regarded as placement for 
a purpose other than mere disposal thereof under Article 1.4.2.2 of the Protocol rather than 
dumping.  However, ocean fertilization activities for purposes other than research should be 
currently regarded as contrary to the aims of the Convention and Protocol.51   
 There is no time here to extensively analyze the extent to which the dumping regime 
constitutes a suitable forum for the management of ocean fertilization activities – scientific 
or otherwise – given that the object of such activities is not disposal per se.52  In light of the 
regime’s more general focus on marine environmental protection, the fact that fertilization 
activities are already taking place and that there is no obvious alternative regulatory forum, 
the adoption of the 2008 Resolution seems eminently sensible.  Nevertheless, the tension in 
– what in practice amounts to a clear expansion of the Protocol’s mandate – is clearly 
evident in the on-going negotiations as to how to take the regulatory regime forward.  An 
Intersessional Working Group on Legal and Related Issues connected to ocean fertilization 
has been established and has identified 8 options ranging from a non-binding statement of 
concern through to amendment of the definition of dumping and a free standing article 
relating to fertilization.  Although some states – notably New Zealand and Australia – favor 
amending Annex I to permit regulated research activities only, there are difficulties in doing 
this without any amendment to the definition of dumping, which in its current formulation, 
would seem to still permit fertilization activities for purposes other than disposal whether 
they are scientific or not.  But an amendment to the definition of dumping under the 1996 
Protocol would potentially create challenges for the application of Article 210 of UNCLOS.  
In any case, whilst the dumping regime might be utilized to manage other geo-engineering 
techniques which involve the introduction of substances into the marine environment such 
as certain weathering technologies and crop residue permanent sequestration, it does not 
                                                 
50 See LC-LP.1/Circ.14 (13 July 2007) 
51 Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008). 
52 See further J. Dean, “Iron Fertilization: A Scientific Review with International Policy Recommendations” 32 
(2008 – 2009) Environs Envtl. L & Pol’y J. 321; D. Freestone and R. Rayfuse, “Ocean Fertilization and 
International Law” 364 (2008) Marine Ecology Progress Series 227; K. Güssow et al, “Ocean Fertilization: Why 
Further Research is Needed” (2010) Marine Policy (in press); J. Peterson, “Can algae save civilization? A look at 
technology, law and policy regarding iron fertilization of the ocean to counteract the greenhouse effect” 6 
(1995) Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 61; R. Rayfuse, “Ocean Fertilization and 
Climate Change: The Need to Regulate Emerging High Seas Uses” 23 (2008) International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 297; K. Scott, “The Day After Tomorrow: Ocean CO2 Sequestration and the Future of Climate 
Change” 18 (2005 – 2006) The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 57, 93 – 106; R. Warner, 
“Preserving a balanced ocean : Regulating Climate Change Mitigation Activities in Marine Areas Beyond 
National Jurisdiction” 14 (2007) Australian International Law Journal 99. 
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have a natural mandate to regulate other forms of geo-engineering such as the ocean pipes 
proposal.   
 Moreover, where no clear regulatory forum can be identified this may lead to 
multiple organizations taking “ownership” so-to-speak of the issue.  This may lead to 
divergent standards or approaches being developed towards particular technologies.  In the 
case of ocean fertilization for example, the parties to the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity adopted Decision IX/16 in 2008 whereby they requested parties to ensure that 
ocean fertilization activities do not take place until there is an adequate scientific basis on 
which to justify activities, including assessing associated risks, and a global, transparent and 
effective control and regulatory mechanism is in place for these activities, with the exception 
of small scale scientific research activities within coastal waters.   This is not necessarily 
consistent with the approach of the parties to the 1996 London Protocol which, at least at 
the moment, are still continuing to consider non-regulatory options for the management of 
research activities.  As has been pointed out by the IOC the reference to coastal waters is 
both unclear and, narrowly, likely to apply in practice to urea as opposed to iron fertilization.  
 Finally, the lack of a clear regulatory mandate may lead individual states or 
corporations to develop their own regulations for research and other activities.  Climos for 
example, has developed its own Code of Conduct (in 2007)53 and, as I noted earlier, a 
committee of the House of Commons in the UK recommended that the precautionary 
principle as a discrete principle should be excluded from the five principles they identified as 
integral to the foundation of a management framework.54 
     
Marine Geo-engineering: the Integration Challenge  
 
The most significant challenge in my view is that without the identification of a clear 
regulatory forum marine geo-engineering will not be managed in a cohesive and integrated 
manner.  Whilst it is understandable and, indeed, appropriate that the parties to the London 
Protocol have taken the initiative to develop a regulatory approach to try to manage activities 
which have already begun, they arguably do not possess the mandate to decide whether geo-
engineering of the marine environment is an appropriate policy and technological response 
to climate change.  Moreover, it in fact makes little sense to separate out marine geo-
engineering from other technologies that make use of the biosphere, the atmosphere or even 
outer space.  These are policy questions that ultimately need to be assessed alongside other 
climate change mitigation strategies such as emissions reductions, renewable energy 
promotion and sequestration.  In practice, these policy questions need to be dealt with 
within the climate change regime. 
 
Proposal 
 
I would like to conclude this paper with a very brief sketch of one possible model of an 
integrated regulatory regime for geo-engineering.   
                                                 
53 Climos Code of Conduct for Ocean Fertilization Projects (27 September 2007) available online at: 
http://www.climos.com/standards/codeofconduct.pdf.  
54 House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee, The Regulation of Geo-engineering (5th Report of 
Session 2009 – 10) (UK)) (para. 86). 
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First, in my opinion we need a global over-arching instrument which will provide 
both the catalyst and the forum for examining geo-engineering options at the international 
level.  This instrument should set out common principles of application to both research and 
mitigation activities.  In connection with marine geo-engineering in particular, those 
principles should include respect for other users of the oceans, marine environmental 
protection, protection of scientific research as well as standard environmental tools such as 
environmental impact assessment, monitoring, cooperation, liability etc.  This instrument 
should also establish the appropriate institutions to provide advice on science and 
engineering matters and to take policy decisions on what if any technologies should be 
developed and how information should be shared. I think that this global instrument should 
be developed as a protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
given that geo-engineering is one of a number of mitigation measures and needs to find its 
place within the context of other measures including emissions reductions and adaptation.  
To the extent that the Kyoto principles of joint implementation and the clean development 
mechanism are applied to geo-engineering projects it is clearly appropriate that these regimes 
are closely connected.   
It is unlikely that such an instrument would provide an appropriate forum to develop 
detailed regulation of application to very different geo-engineering techniques.  I therefore 
propose that the parties to the Protocol designate subsidiary bodies with the appropriate 
expertise to this.  Arguably the London Protocol is the appropriate body for fertilization and 
similar techniques.  The IMO may be the appropriate body to regulate techniques using 
pipes and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is the obvious forum for 
technologies located in space. What is important however, is that appropriate processes and 
institutions are established for the purpose of coordination and communication between 
these bodies so that these activities are managed in a consistent and integrated manner.  
Management would have to be adaptive and be based on science.  Ultimately, it will be up to 
the management or regulatory body established by the over-arching Protocol to decide 
which technologies if any, should be utilized and under what circumstances.  This proposal 
undeniably creates an opportunity for international law to proactively manage the 
development of these technologies and to directly influence and guide both state and non-
state activities in this field.  Without a coordinated response, international regimes and 
institutions including those with responsibility for activities taking place within the marine 
environment risk being in a position where they are simply reacting to developments, the 
consequences of which may extend well beyond the international legal system itself. 
